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Introduction
1 The concept – or at least category – of « crisis » is now so ubiquitous, and apparently also
so indispensable, that if it were banished from common speech a synonym would surely
take  its  place.  But  although most  pundits  and cultural  commentators  can hardly  do
without it, more rigorous analysts are not so sure. If unable to avoid its use they are liable
to try to protect themselves by assigning it a precise meaning, or at least limiting its
fluidity through some stipulative definition. 
2 Still, the term remains elusive. Although some may try to confine it to a given sub-field (a
financial crisis ; a crisis of the regime ; a moral crisis, etc.), it is more commonly observed
that such dysfunctions tend to spill over from any one domain into adjoining territories.
If so, then perhaps the notion of crisis is inherently systemic ? But if by crisis we are to
understand  some  fundamental  break  with  past  structures,  why  do  «  post-crisis  »
outcomes not infrequently bear a strong resemblance to what went before ? Or, if we
define a crisis as an intense but time-limited period of irresolution, does that not exclude
the surely useful idea of a « chronic crisis » ? 
3 Likewise, in current parlance, the global economic crisis dating from the autumn of 2008
has been followed by what some like to call a « new normal ». But that may equally well
« Crisis » in the Americas : Is there a Regionally Distinctive Kind ?
IdeAs, 4 | Automne 2013
1
be viewed as an apparently indefinite succession of aftershocks, each of which could well
count as a crisis in its own right, although all seem linked together. Alternatively, delving
into the medical genealogy of the term, a crisis could also be viewed as the point of
inflection in the progression of an ailment (to be followed either by recovery or collapse),
except that such an organic metaphor implies a unitary bearer of the condition, whereas
many contemporary crises seem to leap continents and morph into unexpected forms
(more like a pandemic than a personal sickness).
 
Broad Reflections on a Broad Concept
4 The polysemy of the word arises not so much from the vagueness of its definitional outer
boundaries as from the vastness and diversity of the external referents to which it can
relate. Even so, something reasonably definite can be proposed about its broad field of
application.  The  idea  of  crisis  presupposes  a  prior  state  of  affairs  characterised  by
normalcy/order/routine.  Some relatively stable and well-structured arrangements are
implied, for it is only when they are disrupted that the ingredients of a crisis begin to
emerge.  Whether  referring  to  brief  small-scale  settlements  (within  the  family,  for
example), or to the millennial features of certain macro-historical civilizations, or to any
social  system  in  between  these  extremes,  apparently  stable  arrangements  create
expectations of regularity. Yet in human affairs all such expectations are fallible, and all
such arrangements are prone to abrupt disruptions. 
5 Whenever such collective assumptions are confounded, those who were enmeshed in the
prior interactions lose their bearings. Normal routines lack their expected cohesion. This
is the generic setting for any crisis. For at least some interval of time the preceding rules
of order can no longer be relied upon. At best there follows an interlude of uncertainty,
while participants contemplate alternative dispensations. During this period of crisis new
expectations may be collectively negotiated,  perhaps accompanied by some emerging
explanation  of  the  sources  of  prior  overconfidence,  possibly  even  some  agreed
assignment of responsibility for the resulting insecurity (perceptions of crisis typically
invite attribution of  blame).  This  process  can generate shared guidance over how to
operate the next phase of social co-operation. Although such smooth crisis management
is one possible outcome, it is of course by no means the norm. Many crises generate
anxiety and conflict that is not so easy to overcome. 
6 Thus, the generic concept of crisis embraces a multitude of diverse possibilities. Its study
spans disciplines across the humanities and the social sciences. It encompasses a wide –
but  not  unlimited  –  array  of  timeframes,  reflecting  the  requirements  of  collective
reassessment applicable in each case. In genealogical terms, this concept follows on from
the ancient Greek meanings of krisis (a turning point in a disease, in the lexicon of Galen),
which include such interpretative elements as choice, decision, judgement, and verdict.
Hence, although crises are generally feared there is also an underlying elective affinity
with the idea of opportunity.
7 This leaves open the question whether only abrupt and adverse « shocks » to expectations
can be counted as crises (arguably an unanticipated bonanza might also precipitate a
disruption of normal expectations, although in this case it is plausible to assume that pre-
existing elites  would have the means to regain control  of  the collective agenda).  On
abruptness, the requirement would be for an event or trigger sufficient to thoroughly
recalibrate collective expectations. But that need not be very sudden, as doubts could
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accumulate gradually over an extended period before « the dam burst ». On whether
shocks must be adverse to create a crisis, at least from an interpretavist standpoint, a
crisis does not require objective harm. What matters is whether the participants in the
system believe their old dispensation has become untenable. 
8 In principle, these convictions might arise even in the absence of any genuine setback. In
addition, of course, many forms of adversity do not deliver a belief shattering « shock » to
prior  expectations.  Obviously  there  is  usually  some  at  least  indirect  link  between
subjective and objective components of a crisis, but so long as the former is lacking there
is,  on this  view,  no « crisis  ».  (Interpretativism can thus be distinguished from both
subjectivism  –  in  which  only  the  perception  of  participants  counts  –  and  from
constructivism – in which participants make their own reality. From an interpretativist
standpoint there is an independent reality, but what turns it into a crisis is the way it is
filtered  through  an  interpretative  lens).  And  from  an  interpretativist  standpoint  all
crises,  however  varied  they  may  be  in  other  dimensions,  must  share  at  least  one




9 The chapters published here arose from the 2009 annual colloquium organized by the
Institut  des  Ameriques in  Paris.  This  was  a  multi-disciplinary  academic  gathering  that
convened just when the global economic crisis that had broken out in 2008 seemed most
acute. The topic of crisis in the Americas had been selected before these developments
were  known,  and  the  perspectives  adopted  were  medium  to  long-term  rather  than
immediatist, although no doubt the ongoing context coloured some of the discussions.
More pertinent to the colloquium was the mixed history of  episodes that had arisen
within the western hemisphere before the Lehmann Brothers collapse. 
10 At least since the debt crisis of 1982, if not before, the dominant view had been that Latin
America  and the Caribbean were relatively  crisis-prone,  whereas  North America  was
normally crisis-free.  The trans-American focus of the 2009 conference was in part an
attempt to re-interrogate that assumption. A second concern was to examine whether the
Americas as a whole manifested variants of crisis,  or displayed attitudes towards the
concept,  that  were  in  any  systematic  way  distinct  from  non-American  ideas  and
experiences on the subject.
11 If Latin America was differentially crisis-prone then it could be concluded that this part
of the Americas was in need of guidance and stabilising orientations from the crisis-free
north. This assumption pervaded the « Washington Consensus » orthodoxies of the 1990s,
but as we can now see it has proved a transient view. In the background loomed a far
more hubristic set of convictions. In contrast to Latin America, where expectations of
disruption to established patterns were still widespread, recurrent, and endemic the then
prevailing liberal internationalism was confident that North America’s democracies had
permanently consolidated their liberal political regimes. Moreover, they had entrenched
human rights and an encompassing rule of law ; softened or even abolished the business
cycle ; and were even on track to make peaceful globalization universal and irreversible.
In sum they had « ended history ».
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12 On  the  fullest  version  of  that  view,  most  (or  all)  of  the  variants  of  crisis  that  had
historically  disturbed  mankind  were  on  the  way  to  being  permanently  abolished.
Provided that the rest of the Americas fell in behind the democratic north the continent
as a whole could become the vanguard of this unparalleled transformation. Obviously,
most observers could see that in its strong form this thesis must be overstated, but during
the 1990s it proved to have considerable pulling power. The sense of « crisis » that built
up from the Twin Towers attack through the Lehmann Brothers collapse reflected the
extent to which such hubristic hopes precipitated intensified fears.
13 Although some leading opinion-formers in Latin America and the Caribbean may have
been swept along by this euphoria at its height, neither the highs nor the lows of this
cycle were so prevalent outside North America as within it. Long local experiences of
recurrent  disappointments  may  have  helped  inoculate  southern  opinion  from  this
northern over-confidence, which in any case cast Latin Americans as the recipients of
guidance  from  without,  rather  than  the  authors  of  their  own  progress.  From  this
standpoint, in very general terms, one might both accept that Latin America’s recent
experiences of crisis distanced the southern part of the continent from the north, while
also concluding that some « crisis-proneness » might not be so bad, if it also counteracted
a potential for hubris.
14 Beyond this very aggregate level of reflection, the colloquium drew on a wide variety of
disciplines  and  analytical  perspectives  from  across  France  and  the  Americas,  and
uncovered a series of much more micro-level aspects of the theme. One recurrent issue
reflects the underlying rationale of the Institute. If multi-disciplinary scholarship about
the Americas is to generate otherwise unavailable insights, it will need to clarify what
features are more prevalent in this large region than in the rest of the world, and to
indicate why such differences have arisen. 
15 In this case, therefore, the question necessarily arises whether there is something specific
to the experience of « crisis » in the Americas, and/or its understanding thereof. The
answers might prove continent-wide, but they could also turn out to highlight differences
between north and south, or indeed other transversal dimensions.
16 But why entertain the possibility that the Americas could have a distinctive orientation to
crisis, compared to the rest of the world ? This might not seem much of an issue if there
was a single unitary concept of crisis, applicable across time and space and captured by a
consensual stipulative definition. However, if the term is polysemic and, in particular, if
its  specific  meaning  depends  heavily  on  the  external  circumstances  under  which  it
becomes  operational,  then  there  might  well  be  an  American  context  and  set  of
understandings that merit separate evaluation. If, for example, the stability of collective
expectations provides a critical backdrop, it is worth considering some proposals about
« the new world » that could differentiate that context from elsewhere1. 
17 It is not outlandish to propose that the coastal geography and urban settlement of the
continent,  together  with  its  experience  of  European  colonization,  and  indeed  the
environmental dimensions of the « Colombian exchange » might well help shape such
expectations. Underlying attitudes towards longstanding social hierarchies might be less
deferential  than  those  often  prevalent  in  Eurasia.  More  generally,  Americans  could
typically be less constrained by the weight of the distant past ; they might have more
optimism about « progress » ; they could be more open to innovation, individualism, and
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mobility ; they could envision a favourable self-placement in a more « globalized » world
system ; and so forth. 
18 Such contextual factors, if indeed they really carry the weight that some observers have
suggested,  would surely  inflect  the content  and significance of  any «  crisis  »  in  the
Americas. The word « inflect » is critical here. The hypothesis for investigation is not that
a categorically different concept of crisis is needed to understand the Americas ; rather it
is that, within the loose encompassing framework of the notion of crisis, the mix and
balance of components likely to prevail in the western hemisphere may merit specific
characterization.
19 With these analytical questions in mind, it is possible to distil five main aspects that were
illuminated in this cycle of studies :
• The  value  of  distinguishing  between  various  kinds  of  crisis,  as  highlighted  by  scholars
approaching the issue from a range of disciplinary and thematic perspectives
• The need to explore the possible existence of certain categories of crisis that are specific to
the United States of America, as opposed to present throughout the Americas
• The contrast between more long-term and structural variants of crisis, and those that are
more fleeting and événementielles, as seen in the course of 2007-2009
• Some crises may prove catastrophic, but there are also versions that are revelatory, and that
may even pave the way for constructive change
• Finally, and at the highest level of abstraction, the comparative study of crises cast light on
the  sociological  underpinnings  of  some  core  collective  beliefs  about  stability  and  its
disruption.
 
Different Kinds of Crisis
20 Consider first the central preoccupation of financial crisis. Comparing cases across the
Americas, it is evident that these are a recurrent feature of the economic history of all
parts of the continent, although they proceed according to diverse rhythms, and obey a
variety of logics, according to time and place2. One subset has been particularly salient in
the region, and is especially longstanding in the United States of America : the financial
« panic », in which a mass of market speculators create a selling frenzy as all try to exit
ahead of each other. While this has a long pedigree in New York (the panics of 1837 and
1907 come particularly  to  mind)  the  one that  erupted there  in  September  2008 was
different to the extent that it proved so global. For at least a few weeks, and probably
longer, it was plausible to fear that confidence in the means of payment would collapse so
thoroughly that bank teller machines around the globe might no longer deliver dollars.
This  was a  short  but  very  intense  episode,  quickly  obliterated  from  the  collective
memory, but it is a classic symptom of financial panic, reminiscent of the conditions in
1907 that gave rise to the creation of the Federal Reserve System.
21 Depressive  crises  are  something  different,  they  last  much  longer,  and  they  produce
structural consequences that can be far more profound. While it is true that a panic can
lead to a depressive crisis the two need to be carefully distinguished. Some thirty per cent
of panics pass without leaving any lasting effects.
22 In a  quite different  register,  Pascale Absi  gave an account of  the economic situation
normally prevailing in the mining cooperatives of Potosi, Bolivia3. Here, penury is the
norm, the daily struggle for existence the routine. In this context, she suggests, a crisis
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arises not through a « crash », but rather as a consequence of a « boom ». This unfamiliar
state of affairs brings about a sudden burst of good fortune, perceived as illogical, and
experienced as disruptive of prior social moeurs. That signifies the scope for crises at two
extremes of the market, not just one. Different again were the analyses of the US labour
movement and its pension system. Here one may identify very slow cumulative structural
crises, without any necessary sudden moment of crystallization. 
 
US-Specific Forms of Crisis?
23 On the political side it is worth noting that Tom Paine’s thirteen « crisis letters » of
1776-83 had a huge impact on public opinion in the American colonies during the war of
independence. He was following London radical ideas in transferring the notion of crisis
from the medical level to the body politic. The first crisis letter of 19 December 1776
began: « These are the times that try men’s souls »; and the final one of April 1783 began «
The time that tried men’s souls are over ». Thus, he clearly identified the seven-year
struggle as  the crisis.  In consequence the concept was explicitly tied to the political
independence from Europe, first of the thirteen colonies, but also subsequently across the
rest of the Americas. Such early and widely disseminated « reflexivity » concerning crisis
as the fount of national identity was characteristically American. Although not entirely
absent from elsewhere it was less clearcut, not so collectively evident, and harder to date
in other regions.
24 There is also an economic case for crisis exceptionalism in the United States. Thus, work
on nineteenth century financial panics in the United States has highlighted the absence
of state structures of supervision and control, by contrast with the European systems that
existed during the same period. For example, there was a Bank of England and a Banque de
France overseeing such episodes in Britain and France. One consequence of this difference
was  that  financial  panics  spread  with  great  ferocity  into  every  aspect  of  the  young
republic’s  economic life.  Another suggested result  was that this may have intensified
aggressive expansionism into new lands, and beyond into Mexico, as a safety valve and
response to heartland economic dislocations. 
25 While these are good historical points to consider, they refer most clearly to the early
history of the United States. Between 1929 and 2008 the record was comparatively crisis-
free at least in conventional terms (cultural change and foreign policy divisions were
another  matter),  and  –  as  we  have  seen  –  it  even  became  possible  to  assume  that
Washington had learnt how to master political and economic crises that were still more
out of control elsewhere, notably in Latin America. Although the events of autumn 2008
can be viewed through the lens of earlier US crisis experiences, this time the reach was
global, and of course Europe is currently proving less well placed than North America to
contain  the  instabilities  of  financial  contagion.  Beyond  such  possibly  temporary
variations, in the twenty-first century it seems most likely that as a part of globalization
experiences  of  economic  crisis  round the  world  will  have  tendency  to  interact,  and
probably also to converge.
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Structural vs. Conjunctural Crises
26 Although most understandings of crisis include a trigger and a point of resolution, it is
also possible to envisage this on a variety of temporal scales. So the idea of a longue durée
crisis is not oxymoronic. But when it comes to examining structural crises it may be as
important to specify the sector, or domain in question as to pinpoint the timescale. The
colloquium  considered  the  university  system,  the  labour  movement,  and  the
consumption sector. It is possible to encounter a crisis in one of these areas, without it
necessarily becoming generalized to the whole society.  If  so,  that makes it  critical to
separate temporalities from institutional spheres when diagnosing a structural crisis. 
27 As Jacques Pothier and Pascale Morvan4 emphasized, it may often be critical to examine
the ideological  and cultural  dimensions of  a  structural  crisis,  and not to confine the
analysis  solely  to  the  material  sphere.  But  that  broadens  the  focus  of  study  and
complicates the picture. By contrast, the study of a conjunctural or événementielle crisis
may well benefit from a sharp delimitation of the field and a strong emphasis on tightly
narrated progressions. Whereas it is hard to see how a structural crisis can be attributed
to the intentional action of any particular power-holder, more conjunctural crises may in
principle be attributable to identifiable acts of volition (Napoleon’s « hundred days »
comes to mind here).
 
Catastrophes vs. « Revelatory » Crises
28 Crises  can  be  classified  according  to  their  origins,  their  dynamics,  and  their
consequences. If the consequences are unremittingly destructive, leading to a disastrous
cumulative downward spiral, they can be categorised as catastrophes. Jared Diamond has
highlighted  the  examples  of  the  Maya  and  the  Anasazi  prior  to  the  arrival  of  the
Europeans as North American examples5. Some catastrophes may be inevitable, but the
comparative analysis of such processes is usually motivated by the thought that if they
can be understood then perhaps lessons can be drawn, and future repetitions averted. So
even the retrospective study of catastrophic collapses leaves spaces for the prospective
consideration of « revelatory » crises. 
29 Only a fine line separates the two. At the onset of what could turn into a collapse the
participants discover the fragility of the assumptions of stability on which they had been
relying. This could be a moment of revelation. If they are well advised and farsighted they
may be able to profit from the shock of the initial crisis, changing their expectations and
behaviour sufficiently to reverse the downward spiral. This is the sense in which crisis is
sometimes cast as « opportunity ». In 2009 the Group of Twenty believed that they had
grasped the message of the 2008 financial panic, and were capable of coordinated action
in time to head off the risk of a repeat of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The full
consequences of that sequence of events remain to be played out, and it is not always the
case that a revelatory crisis can avert the impending catastrophe. (Certainly, in the case
of the slow unfolding of the logic of anthropogenic climate change the signs so far are not
encouraging). 
30 What determines whether a crisis proves revelatory or catastrophic ? There is no single
magic bullet. In addition to luck, accidents of timing and similar contingent elements,
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some driving forces are easier to grasp in advance and then deflect than others. Expert
advice  and  lessons  from  the  past  may  be  helpful  or  misleading, usually  a  partial
combination of the two. And, of course, the social science community has manufactured a
whole edifice of theory accounting for « collective action » problems, and the role of
institutions in managing them.
31 Two general propositions can be ventured. First, no matter how technically well equipped
or institutionally prepared we may believe ourselves to be, the possibility of catastrophe
is always with us. Overconfidence in human mastery over the fates is called hubris for a
reason,  and  still  nurtures  nemesis.  Second,  short  of  an  ultimate  global  catastrophe,
« revelatory » crises typically prove more opportune for some, while still  turning out
badly for many others. The recent European fashion for « solidarity » as a defence against
crisis is hard to sustain when things get serious. In the Americas the « solidarity reflex »
is still relatively weak, a drawback in quiet times, but possibly an advantage in seeking to
escape from extreme shocks.
 
Core Assumptions about Stability
32 Independently from their consequences, the comparative study of crises uncovers hidden
assumptions about the nature and sources of social stability. Ahead of a crisis it is possible
to  identify  a  «  conventional  wisdom  »  or  set of  simplifying  operating  assumptions,
perhaps somewhat ideological in character, which help to justify the prevailing order and
established ways of coping with discord and disturbance. But when a crisis unfolds it
quickly becomes apparent that key elements of this outlook were either mistaken or at
least incomplete. There will probably be a stratum of critics and intellectual dissidents
who can claim to have foreseen in advance that the conventional wisdom was built on
sand. In crisis conditions such standpoints can quickly acquire an unexpectedly large and
enthusiastic following. With hindsight it  suddenly becomes much harder to shrug off
what  now  seem  like  well-founded  and  public  spirited  unmaskings  of  the  previous
convenient fictions. It is the collective shock of the crisis experience that creates the
demand for  a  serious  consideration of  alternatives,  and for  a  deeper  probing of  the
underlying realities.
33 The colloquium highlighted a few examples that can be fitted into this framework. The «
inevitable westernization of the world » was a tacit operating assumption expected to
guide and stabilize the post-cold war international system and the end of the last century.
Although dissident voices persisted throughout the Americas, they lacked credibility and
impact,  until  the  crisis  of  11  September  2001.  The ensuing «  rise  of  Asia  »  and the
Lehmann crisis cast doubt on the earlier conventional wisdom. (In the wake of those
shocks  to  expectations  some  new  ideas  have  gained  more  currency,  but  the  old
convenient fictions have not been comprehensively dethroned, and no consensual new
stabilizing discourse has yet emerged. One could claim that the international sense of
crisis will persist as long as the current incoherent jumble of ideas to be found in such
gatherings as the G8 Summit persists). 
34 On a more technical note Jaime Marquez Pereira made a strong case that it was only by
revisiting some foundational assumptions about the logic of the modern market economy
that the current propensity for unconstrained financial crisis might be tamed. Similarly
Christian Azais and his colleagues posed some foundational questions about the workings
of contemporary labour markets. The focus on the hidden divide between « insiders » and
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the  rest  was  especially  relevant6.  To  this  I  would  add  the  increasingly  stark  divide
between the interests of successive cohorts of the labour force, including the increasing
veto power of pensioners with rapidly rising life expectancies. 
35 Beyond these economic themes, the cultural realm is also generating dynamic challenges
to past sources of conventional wisdom such as the printed press, the old book trade,
ancient educational institutions, and so on, as the next generation turns away from these
stabilizing and structuring authorities and turns to horizontal forms of networking for its
orientations. Mass political parties are coming to look like relics from the past century, as
party  membership  ages  and  dwindles,  together  with  trade  union  affiliations,  church
membership, traditional family structures, and similar lifelong commitments that used to
stabilize western democracies -  no doubt in association with « jobs for life » and an
encompassing welfare state.  By contrast  the rising generations are more likely to be
attracted to short  term mass street  protests  that  reject  party politics  and long term
programmatic projects. Such generational shifts in participatory culture are reinforced
by  the  larger  transcontinental  redistributions  of  power  and  opportunity  that  has
accompanied increased global connectivity, the rise of Asia, and the shortening of time
horizons that is integral to worldscale cycles of consumer innovation. In short, as such
processes of social change accelerate, while life expectancies also increase, the cultural
experiences  of  successive  generations  diverge,  creating the potential  for  more inter-
generational  variants  of  «  crisis  ».  There  are  still  some  distinctively  «  American  »
manifestations of this dynamic, but the main twenty-first century drivers appear to be
increasingly global in nature.
Diamond, Jared, Collapse : How Societies choose to Fail or Survive, London, Allen Lane, 2005.
Kindleberger, Charles, Manias, Panics, and Crashes : A History of Financial Crises, New York,
Macmillan, 1989 (second edition).
Watson, Peter, The Great Divide : History and Human Nature in the Old World and the New,
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2012.
NOTES
1. A case can also be made for deeply contrasting beliefs about the stability of the social order in
pre-conquest  American civilizations,  as  compared to  the  Old  World.  Thus,  Peter  Watson has
stressed  the  geographical  and  climatological  factors  (earthquakes,  volcanoes,  hurricanes)
affecting  the  stability  of  religious  authority  in  the  Americas,  and  their  fearful  social
consequences. See Peter Watson (2012).
2. For a classic comparative survey which gives due weight to the United States case, see Charles
Kindleberger (1989).
3. To appear in IdeAs n°5 (January 2014). 
4. To appear in IdeAs n°5 (January 2014).
5. See Jared Diamond (2005).
6. To appear in IdeAs n°5 (January 2014).
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RÉSUMÉS
Bien que l'idée de « crise » soit indiscutable, elle exclue une définition catégorique à cause de sa
polysémie. Ce que les nombreuses variantes du terme ont en commun, c'est la principale notion
d'une sorte de normalité ou d'ordre. C'est ce que toute crise bouleverse. Mais les conceptions de
l'ordre  normal  des  choses  sont  variables  dans  le  temps  et  l'espace.  Les  composantes  de  ce
contexte sont-elles  donc spécifiques aux Amériques (ou à toute partie interne du continent),
différenciant ainsi leurs crises de celles qui surviennent ailleurs ? L'article explore les diverses
pistes  de cette  possibilité,  en disloquant  les  éléments  clés  de  la  situation américaine qui  est
largement  répandue,  et  en  en  élaborant  d'autres,  plus  probants.  La  différence  entre  les
Amériques et le reste du monde serait tout au plus une modulation, sujette à l'insistance, et non
un contraste définitif (une accentuation américaine du phénomène « d'alerte sur le marché »). Il
existe des preuves d'une enclave typiquement américaine sur l'idée de crise au cours des deux
siècles  derniers,  mais  dans  les  conditions  actuelles  d'une  mondialisation  accélérée,  une  telle
différentiation locale va diminuer.
Although the idea of « crisis  » is  indispensable it  eludes categorical  definition because of its
polysemy.  What  the  multiple  variants  of  the  term  share  is  a  prior  notion  of  some  kind  of
normalcy or order. That is what every crisis disrupts. But conceptions of the normal order of
things are variable across time and space. So, are there features specific to the Americas (or to
some sub-regions within the continent) that differentiate their crises from those encountered
elsewhere  ?  The article  explores  this  possibility,  by  disaggregating key  aspects  of  the  broad
concept, and by sketching some relevant aspects of the American context. At most, the difference
between the Americas and the rest would be an inflection point, a matter of emphasis, and not a
categorical  contrast  (for  example  an American accentuation of  the phenomenon of  « market
panic »). There is some evidence of a distinctively American take on the idea of crisis over the
past  two  centuries,  but  in  current  conditions  of  accelerated  globalization  such  regional
differentiation is on the decline.
El concepto de « crisis » es tan indispensable como difícil de precisar porque su polisemia no
permite una definición categórica.  Sus múltiples variantes presuponen un estado anterior de
normalidad o de orden que la crisis desestabiliza. Pero nuestras percepciones de la « normalidad
» varían según el lugar y el tiempo. Ante esto, será que las Américas (en su totalidad o en sus sub-
regiones),  con sus condicionantes  espaciales  y  temporales,   pueden generar  un tipo de crisis
diferente  de las  que se  producen fuera  del  continente  ?  Este  ensayo explora  dicha cuestión,
considerando varias dimensiones del concepto y conectándolas con ciertos temas relevantes en el
contexto continental. Lo más que se puede esperar del contraste entre las Américas y el Viejo
Mundo son variaciones cualitativas (por ejemplo, una variante más intensa del fenómeno de «
pánico » financiero). Si bien existen indicaciones de que ha habido una versión específicamente
« americana » del concepto de crisis en los últimos siglos, estas tendencias tienden a declinar y a
desaparecer ante la globalización acelerada que vivimos.
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